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9. When Inner Speech Misleads
Sam Wilkinson and Charles Fernyhough
This chapter examines whether and when the experience of inner speech can be 
inaccurate and thereby mislead the subject. It presents a view about the representational 
content of speech experience generally and then applies it to inner speech in particular. 
On such a view, speech experience typically presents us with far more than simply the 
low-level acoustic properties of speech: it conveys the relevant mental states of the (actual 
or hypothetical) speaker. Similarly, inner speech presents inner speakers with their own 
mental states. In light of this, inner speech can mislead either by presenting the subject 
with mental states they do not in fact have, or by presenting these mental states as 
belonging to another agent. The chapter reflects on the sorts of contexts in which either of 
these could occur.
9.1. Introduction
Most philosophers think that at least some experiences have representational content: 
they represent the world as being a certain way.1 Representational content dictates 
accuracy conditions, namely, what would need to be the case in order for the experience 
to be accurate. Inner speech, that “interior monologue” or familiar voice inside your head, 
is something that we experience, and that experience of inner speech seems to have 
representational content: it seems to “tell” the subject that something is going on in the 
world. Our central question is: What is it that the experience of inner speech is telling the 
subject is going on in the world, and could it, in some circumstances, be telling the subject 
something inaccurate? In other words: When, if ever, does the experience of inner speech 
mislead?
This may seem like a strange question to ask, and its importance may not be immediately 
obvious, but answering it has a number of significant implications. To start with, the 
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question about whether the experience of inner speech can mislead requires us to answer 
a more basic question first: what sorts of things enter into the representational content of 
an experience of inner speech? This question is of tremendous importance since it tells us 
what the epistemic weight of an experience of inner speech is, namely, the content that it 
carries. In particular, if we view the experience of inner speech as important to self-
knowledge, the content of the experience will tell us more precisely what the route to that 
self-knowledge is.
A more specific implication of an answer to this question is that there are unusual 
experiences (often in the context of psychiatric diagnoses), such as auditory verbal 
hallucinations (AVHs), which are taken by a number of theorists to involve inner speech 
(Frith 1992, Seal et al. 2004, Jones & Fernyhough 2007). If we think of AVHs as 
experiences of inner speech, we can usefully ask ourselves: is this experience of inner 
speech telling the subject something inaccurate? And if it is, what aspects of the world 
aren’t, and which are, the way they are represented as being?
At this point it is important to clarify two things. First, there is the question of what 
exactly we mean by an “experience of inner speech”. Some might want to say that inner 
speech simply is an experience. Others might want to say that inner speech is something 
that we do, and which we have an experience of. At this stage we remain neutral between 
these two, but it will become clear later on that our position is more in line with the latter. 
Second, it is important to clarify that we are talking about the experiential content of an 
experience of inner speech and not its linguistic content. We are not talking about 
utterances of inner speech linguistically expressing inaccuracies. Thus to draw an analogy 
with outer speech experience, if someone says “Madrid is the Capital of France”, although 
they have said something inaccurate, my experience is accurate to the extent that it has 
accurately represented various features of the utterance, for example, the speech sounds 
produced, and perhaps more besides (a central part of this chapter is the controversy 
surrounding this). Now, the extent to which this analogy with outer speech holds is itself 
up for dispute and will depend upon how we think of inner speech.
We proceed as follows. We start by presenting an intuitively appealing view according to 
which an episode of inner speech is an imaginative episode, and therefore cannot mislead 
(at least not in the relevant sense). We criticize this view and reject it in favour of the view 
that inner speech is actually a kind of speech, rather than merely imagined speech. We 
then present a view about the representational content of speech experience generally, and 
then apply it to inner speech in particular. We end, in light of this, by presenting the 
different ways in which inner speech could potentially mislead.
9.2. Content without Commitment: Inner Speech as Imagination
It is important to distinguish representational content from psychological force. 
Perceiving and believing have representational content, but they also have a certain 
psychological force: they don’t merely represent a content, they represent that content as 














world being the way represented.2 Other psychological states or events (such as 
suppositions or certain imaginings etc.) on the other hand may represent something but 
lack that kind of commitment to what is going on in the world. If you voluntarily imagine 
a pink unicorn, it cannot be regarded as an inaccurate experience just because there is no 
such thing in front of you (or no such thing in existence at all).3 The experience is not 
even in the running for accuracy. That said, the experience has representational content: it 
is of (or represents) a pink unicorn. What you have in this case of imagining is content 
(something is represented, it is about something) without commitment to accuracy. 
Another way of thinking about this lack of commitment to accuracy is that the 
imaginative episode is not presenting an aspect of the world over and above the 
experience itself (and so, trivially, it cannot do so inaccurately).
Some might think that inner speech is like that. Inner speech, on this view, is like 
imagining yourself speaking (and hearing yourself speak). The experience does not 
inform you about something going on in the world, and, as such, it cannot be wrong since 
the world cannot act as a benchmark against which the experience can fall short. There 
simply is the experience, presenting itself pure and simple. At most, if this is true, an inner 
speech experience tells you the immediate and infallible fact that you are having that very 
experience. On such a view, inner speech may represent certain things, which would be 
reflected in the phenomenology of inner speech, much in the same way as imagining a 
pink unicorn represents certain things (like pinkness and unicorns), and this too is 
reflected in the phenomenology of the experience, but neither experience purports to tell 
you anything about the world beyond the experience itself. On such a view, inner speech, 
as a variety of imagination, cannot be inaccurate: it just is what it is.4
But is inner speech an instance of imagination? We think that the answer is no. A crucial 
step to seeing why this is the case involves an appreciation of the distinction between 
imagination and imagery. Imagination is a whole psychological event in its own right. 
People are engaged in acts of imagination. These acts of imagination enable them to 
appreciate, in potentially many different ways, non-actual scenarios, and, when they are 
engaged in such acts, they may be motivated to do so by a number of different things. 
They may be trying to judge whether they could have jumped over that river, reason about 
a social situation, or simply engage in imagination for the pleasure of it. Furthermore it is 
in the nature of imagination to have content without commitment (which is not to say 
2 In perception, it is a commitment that you can override: you don’t have to take your perceptual 
experience at face value.
3 The term “imagination” gets used in lots of different ways for different purposes, for example, 
there are imagistic and propositional forms of imagining. What we mean by imagining is simply a 
mental state (or, better, episode) that represents something and has no commitment to its reality 
or actuality (it is hence to be contrasted with judgement and perception, which do have such 
commitments). Thus imagination may or may not recruit imagery, and is certainly not 
synonymous with imagery.
4 To put it another way there is no appearance/reality distinction. Since the phenomenon is an 
appearance, the appearance is the reality.













that it cannot serve, and fail to serve, a given function). These acts of imagination often 
will recruit or make use of imagery in many modalities, but there will also be aspects to 
the imaginative experience that aren’t purely imagistic. Imagery, in contrast, is not in itself 
a complete psychological event. It features as a component of such events. Whereas people 
imagine things, people don’t “imagize” or “do imagery”. When people imagine things, 
imagery may be involved, but it is not all that is involved. And, crucially, imagery is also 
involved in many psychological events that aren’t imaginings. For example, imagery may 
be involved in episodic recollections. It may even be involved in certain judgements (see, 
e.g. Langland-Hassan 2015). In other words it may be involved in psychological events 
that, unlike imagining (in the sense that we are using the term), have an inbuilt 
commitment to how things are (or were, in the case of memory) in the world.
In light of this, it is too quick to move from the (accurate) observation that inner speech 
involves imagery to the conclusion that an episode of inner speech is a case of imagination. 
And if it is not a case of imagination then it seems, at least in principle, that, as an 
experience, it can be committed to telling you something about the world.5
9.3. Inner Speech as Speech
If inner speech is not imagination, then what is it? In line with a number of other theorists 
(Vygotsky 1987/1934, Fernyhough 1996, Martinez-Manrique & Vicente 2010) our answer 
is: it is speech. It is speech in two important senses. First, it is a productive rather than 
recreative activity. Second, its primal use is in making speech acts: asserting, questioning, 
insulting etc. We take these points in turn.
9.3.1. Inner speech as productive rather than re-creative
To see the productive rather than re-creative nature of inner speech we need to ask 
ourselves not just, “What is inner speech?” or “What does it look like once developed?” 
but also: “How and why did it develop?” One attractive theory (which originates in 
Vygotsky 1987/1934), which carries both evolutionary and developmental plausibility, 
states that inner speech starts off as speech (namely, outer or “overt” speech). That is to 
say, whatever function inner speech plays, once it has developed, is played by outer speech 
in children who have not yet developed the capacity to engage in inner speech. This 
capacity to engage in inner speech is usually seen as partly constituted by the capacity to 
inhibit the overt production of speech.
According to this story, inner speech is the end product of a developmental trajectory that 
begins with private speech. “Private speech” refers to outer speech that is not produced for 
5 One natural question at this point is whether inner speech can ever be an instance of 
imagining. This is a tricky question. In the first instance we want to say that paradigmatic inner 
speech isn’t imagination. But the question of whether inner speech can sometimes be an 
instance of imagining seems to get things the wrong way round: imaginative episodes may be 














the benefit of anyone other than the speaker. Young children will first, under the guidance 
of a caregiver, learn to reason verbally, but out loud, for the benefit of guiding their 
thinking and attention. Over time, they learn to “internalize” this speech, to inhibit its 
overt production. However, as with many cases of motoric inhibition, vestiges of the 
motor processes remain. Evidence of motoric involvement in inner speech has been 
empirically supported by several electromyographical (EMG) studies, measuring 
muscular activity during inner speech, some of which date as far back as the early 1930s 
(e.g. Jacobsen 1931). In short, these discovered that, when you engage in inner speech, 
muscles in the face and throat, associated with speaking, are activated (see also Rapin et 
al. 2013).
There have been brain-imaging studies (fMRI) presenting results that are very much in 
keeping with the distinction between a productive phenomenon, namely, inner speech 
proper, and a re-creative imaginative phenomenon, imagined speech. In particular, Tian 
& Poeppel (2012) and Tian, Zarate, and Poeppel (2016) have shown that there are two 
very different ways of generating auditory-verbal imagery, namely, of activating relevant 
areas of auditory sensory cortices in the absence of external sensory stimulation. One, 
which corresponds to inner speech (which they call “articulation imagery”) is induced 
through “motor simulation”, i.e., is initiated “top-down” by activation in areas of prefrontal 
and motor cortex associated with speaking. The other, which corresponds to inner 
hearing/imagined speech, is induced, in line with more standard accounts of imagery 
(including in other modalities, such as vision), via a memory-based mechanism (e.g. 
Kosslyn 1994), i.e., by the re-creation of a sensory event (derived, to some extent, from 
past sensory events). While the former mechanism involves trying to produce something 
directly (and its inhibition results in imagery being activated as part of the sensory 
predictions of the completed action), the latter involves trying to re-create the sensory 
effects of a past or constructed scenario. There is a sense in which imagining hearing 
something entirely new (i.e., not previously experienced) is “producing something”, but 
not in the same sense that inner speaking is productive. Unlike the latter, it involves the 
recreation of the sensory effect of an event, in this case an event that has never happened.
This distinction between a productive and re-creative phenomenon may map onto a 
phenomenological distinction between two different forms that auditory-verbal imagery 
can take. Using descriptive experience sampling (DES), Hurlburt and colleagues 
(Hurlburt, Heavey, and Kelsey 2013) isolated two differently reported phenomena: “inner 
speaking” on the one hand, and “inner hearing” on the other. The former may correspond 
to the top-down mechanism of generating imagery that Tian and colleagues isolated; the 
latter, to the more bottom-up mechanism. Nevertheless, equating Hurlburt’s “inner 
speaking” with “inner speech” does not suffice to show that “inner speech” is not a case of 
imagination. The reason for this is that it seems plausible that inner speaking can take 
part in imaginative episodes as well as in more authentic or ecologically valid instances of 
inner speech. If you imagine yourself going up to someone and speaking to them, nothing 
prevents this from engaging the sort of top-down imagery that Tian and colleagues 
isolate, or in having phenomenological features more akin to inner speaking than to inner 
hearing. What we actually need is three-way distinction among the phenomena that make 













use of auditory-verbal imagery: (i) a genuinely productive phenomenon (which we are 
about to introduce, and which constitutes ecologically valid inner speech); (ii) a re-
creative productive phenomenon (like the case of imagining yourself speak to someone, 
which involves inner speaking); and (iii) a re-creative sensory phenomenon (inner 
hearing). Whereas (ii) involves the same (or much of the same) apparatus as (i), it is used 
in a different context and for a different purpose (i.e., for the recreation of a counterfactual 
scenario). On the other hand, (iii) recruits sensory imagery for a similar re-creative 
activity as (ii). The genuinely productive phenomenon, namely, (i), is what we examine 
now.
9.3.2. Inner speech acts as the main form of inner speech
Following Roessler (2016) we can distinguish between a “mere act of inner speech” and an 
“inner speech act”, in a way that perfectly mirrors the distinction between a “mere act of 
speech” and a “speech act”. Although there are different accounts of speech acts (see 
Austin 1962, Searle 1969, Bach & Harnish 1979 for some classic formulations) everyone 
agrees that speech acts are closely tied to the speaker’s mental state in a way that mere acts 
of speech are not. If you change the mental state in relevant ways, then you change the 
speech act in relevant ways. Indeed, if you remove the mental state, then you thereby 
remove the speech act altogether. Examples will make things clearer. Reciting a poem, or 
repeating an address so as to remember it, is an act of speech, but it is not a speech act. 
This is, in part, because the speaker, in reciting, or repeating, does not mean what is being 
said, and any potential variations in the subject’s mental states are compatible with the 
same act being performed (and variations in what is repeated or recited do not thereby 
signal similar variations in the subject’s mental states). In stark contrast, sincerely 
asserting, requesting, demanding, questioning are speech acts. These require the person 
performing them to be in certain states of mind. For example, an assertion (if sincere) 
requires the asserter to believe what they are asserting, a question (if sincere) requires the 
questioner to have the desire to know the answer to the question, and so on.
This fact adds further weight to the point that inner speech is not imagined speech, but 
rather is speech. Consider the following:
1. Jane asserted that p
2. Jane imagined asserting that p
3. Jane asserted in inner speech that p
Whereas 3 implies 1, 2 does not. In fact, if anything, 2 implies that 1 is false: merely 
imagining asserting rules out actually asserting (just like imagining raising your right 
hand rules out you actually doing so). On the other hand, an assertion in inner speech is a 
perfectly good instance of assertion.6 And insofar as 1 and 3 are both assertions, they 
both, if sincere, require that Jane be in a certain mental state (i.e., believing that p). In a 
6 Things are somewhat complicated by the fact that some theorists (e.g. Searle 1969) make it a 














related manner, assertions that p are treated as evidence for the attribution of the mental 
states that they (if sincere) require (or express), in this case, believing that p. Thus if 
someone asserts, “Paris is the capital of France”, you will (other things being equal) think 
that they believe that Paris is the capital of France. The same applies to other kinds of 
speech acts, and other kinds of speech acts are intimately tied to other kinds of mental 
state. Orders and requests are tied to goals, questions are tied to desires to know, 
compliments are tied to positive evaluations, insults to negative evaluations, etc. And 
when people request, question, compliment, or insult, if we take them to be sincere, we 
thereby take them to be in those mental states.
Of course, there is one rather perplexing feature of inner speech, construed as an inner 
speech act, which is: why do we engage in it at all? Usually when we assert, question, or 
insult in outer speech, we have an addressee. We are speaking our minds to someone else. 
When we assert, question or insult in inner speech, who are we doing it for? Who are we 
speaking our minds to? The answer is: ourselves.
Organisms that live in groups, that cooperate and communicate, can do so very 
successfully without inner speech, and also without the need to directly introspect. They 
simply need to express themselves to their conspecifics. These communicative acts do not 
require the organism to have reflected on, or even have prior access to, its own mental 
state: the expression can be spontaneous and unreflective. However, once produced, these 
communicative acts can be perceived and interpreted by the agent who produced them. 
But of course, this cannot be regularly used as a way of accessing your mental states, since 
that would involve making your beliefs, desires, plans, and evaluations entirely public. 
That would often be, at best, socially unacceptable, and, at worst, downright dangerous. 
Inner speech can be understood in part as a solution to this problem of indiscretion: it is a 
way of expressing, and hence accessing and reflecting upon, your own state of mind 
without thereby having to risk giving that information away to others.7
There are many theorists who would be in general agreement with this picture (e.g. 
Jackendoff 1996, Clark 1996, Carruthers 2011). One interesting feature of positing this 
role for inner speech is that it suggests that we (at least sometimes, perhaps always) lack 
other more direct means of reflecting on our mental states. Our view is that inner speech 
certainly helps a great deal with reflection on our minds, but there are certainly ways of so 
reflecting that don’t make use of inner speech.
assertions (and that these carry the same features as “normal” assertions, e.g., have the same 
sincerity conditions). This can either be accommodated by (contra Searle) removing the dialogic 
requirement, or by claiming that human inner speech is in some important sense dialogic. As will 
become clearer, we would opt for the latter.
7 We say “in part” because although inner speech, like outer speech, offers us improved self-
knowledge, it doesn’t always, or even often, serve that purpose. Much of the time it regulates 
our behaviour and focuses our attention.













9.4. The Experiential Content of Speech Experience
If inner speech is, in an important sense, speech, it is reasonable to assume that we may 
learn about its content by examining the content of speech experience per se. As it 
happens, there is currently a lively philosophical debate about the content of the auditory 
experience of speech (see O’Callaghan 2011 and Brogaard forthcoming). This debate is a 
specific version of a more general debate about the content of perceptual experience 
generally. There are those, sometimes called “liberals”, who want to allow that “high-level 
properties” can enter into the contents of perceptual experience (e.g. Siegel 2006, Bayne 
2009), and there are those, sometimes called “conservatives” (e.g. Dretske 1995, Tye 1995), 
who claim that only “low-level properties” can.
A concrete case will be helpful here. Suppose you are looking at a green apple, and 
suppose that you know that it’s a Granny Smith apple, and, furthermore, that it was grown 
in Chile. The apple in question has:
(i). a certain shape and colour
(ii). the property of being an apple
(iii). the property of being a Granny Smith apple
(iv). the property of having been grown in Chile
The further down this list you go, in terms of accepting that it could enter into the content 
of perceptual experience, the more “liberal” you are about the admissible content of 
perceptual experience. Even the most liberal of liberals will admit that (iv) just isn’t the 
right kind of property for your perceptual experience to convey. You may come to know 
that the apple was grown in Chile, but you can’t have known that solely on the basis of 
your perceptual experience. Liberals, however, may claim that (iii) can enter into the 
content of perceptual experience for, say, someone familiar with Granny Smiths. And they 
will certainly say that (ii) enters into the content of perceptual experience for those of us 
familiar with apples. The conservative, on the other hand, wants to say that only (i) is the 
purview of perceptual experience: (ii) and (iii) go beyond what perceptual experience can 
represent.
This debate came to prominence in the light of a classic argument in favour of liberalism 
that proceeded by presenting what might be called “contrast cases” (see Siegel 2006 for 
perhaps the classic example of a contrast case). In contrast cases, you compare two cases 
where the “low-level” properties represented (e.g. colour and shape) remain constant, but 
the “high-level” properties represented are different because, in one of the cases, the high-
level properties cannot be represented due to lack of knowledge or expertise. For example, 
looking at one and the same oak tree will be phenomenologically different depending on 
whether you know nothing of tree species, or whether you are an expert. The idea is that 
the two cases differ in specifically perceptual phenomenology, and that this should be 
attributed to the representation of high-level properties in perceptual experience. The 
expert, in automatically recognizing the oak, has represented in her perceptual experience 














When applied to speech perception, the very same phenomenal contrast arguments can 
be used, and are perhaps even more convincing since language is an area where expertise 
has especially powerful effects on experience. If you think about the phenomenological 
difference between hearing a language that you understand and one that you don’t, it 
seems plausible that understanding a spoken language makes it sound different (see, e.g. 
Strawson 1994). This has led some people to attribute this to the representation of 
meaning in auditory speech experience. Thus, you don’t merely get loudness, pitch, and 
timbre represented: you also get “high-level” properties like meaning (in a way that is akin 
to how you get the high-level property “oak tree” in the visual case).
O’Callaghan (2011) has recently criticized the view that meanings are represented in the 
auditory experience of speech. He does, however, accept that there is a phenomenological 
contrast between hearing speech when you understand the language and when you don’t, 
and he accepts that the contrast is one of perceptual (rather than emotional or cognitive) 
phenomenology. What he thinks explains the difference is the representation, in one 
instance, of, not the standard low-level properties of loudness, pitch, and timbre, but 
properties a bit “higher” (we might call them mid-level properties), namely language-
specific phonological properties (“language-specific” in the sense of specific to, say, French 
as opposed to German).
O’Callaghan’s reasons for adopting such a view stem from another contrast case that 
compares homophones. He claims that there is no phenomenological difference between 
hearing homophones, even if we perceive them as having different meanings. So, to take 
an example, if we hear an utterance of “bank” (the financial institution) and “bank” (the 
edge of a river), they sound the same. As a result, O’Callaghan claims that it isn’t meaning 
that explains the phenomenological difference, since here we have different meanings but 
the same phenomenology. Rather, what better explains the difference between hearing 
languages you do and don’t understand is familiarity or expertise with the phonology of 
the known language, which affects the temporal and qualitative features the relevant 
speech sounds are experienced as having.
As Brogaard (forthcoming) rightly points out, this argument from homophones has the 
weakness that it arguably isn’t words that are the relevant vehicles of meaning, but entire 
utterances, namely, sentences used in context. We would go a step further and say that, 
whatever “meaning” is taken to be (it refers to different abstract entities for different 
purposes) the relevant sense in which meaning is represented in speech experience is in 
the sense of “speaker meaning”, namely, the underlying mental state of the speaking agent 
that is expressed by the speech act. What makes it the case that two assertions of “I’m 
going down to the bank” are experienced differently based on attributing different 
meanings to the word “bank” is that in one case you take the speaker to be expressing 
(their belief in) their intention to go to a financial institution, while in the other you take 
the speaker to be expressing (their belief in) their intention to go to the edge of the river. 
That said, the phenomenological difference between the two uses of “I’m going down to 
the bank” is very subtle, and some people may deny its existence. Clearer examples are 
cases of syntactic ambiguity (“I’m glad I’m a man and so is Lola”), or cases of sarcasm (e.g. 













saying “Well done” in a berating, rather than congratulatory manner). Of course, in such 
cases (especially sarcasm) the acoustic properties of the utterance are often altered by the 
speaker in order to promote one interpretation over the other. This, however, doesn’t 
mean that two identical speech sounds won’t be experienced as phenomenologically 
different if interpreted differently.
However, the conservative can say that, although there is a phenomenological difference, 
it is attributable to phenomenological differences associated with judgements about the 
speaker’s mental state, rather than experiences of these mental states. Thus when I hear 
“I’m glad I’m a man and so is Lola”, it is phenomenologically different to judge that the 
speaker is expressing gladness that he and Lola are both men, than to judge that the 
speaker is expressing that both Lola and he are glad that he is a man. In other words, the 
phenomenology is different, but it is not experiential phenomenology. One problem with 
this suggestion is that the relevant phenomenology remains even when we know that the 
speaker doesn’t have that mental state (e.g., is acting on stage), or when the speaker is just 
a vague, hypothetical construct (e.g., as when abstractly considering different utterances, 
or hearing announcements at the train station). It doesn’t therefore seem that it can be 
something to do with judgement. Granted, it could be a phenomenology associated with 
something less committal than judgement, but that remains non-experiential. Whatever 
this state may be, the phenomenology seems stimulus-bound, bound to the experience, so 
why not view it as part of the experience?8
The other thing that the conservative might say, which is very much in line with what 
O’Callaghan says, is that judging, or even merely hypothesizing that a speech sound 
expresses a certain (even hypothetical) mental state has a top-down influence on how the 
low-level stuff is experienced. That doesn’t mean that perceptual experience represents 
anything over and above those low-level properties. The difference in phenomenology is 
indeed a difference in properly perceptual content, but this difference just is a difference in 
those low-level properties. In other words, a premise of the liberal’s contrast case doesn’t 
hold, since the low-level properties aren’t being kept constant after all.
This seems like a plausible response, but then the debate becomes one of conceptual 
cartography. What do you mean by “perceptual experience”? In particular, the liberal 
could just say that these and similar top-down influences are so rife in even the most basic 
forms of perception, that that just is what perceptual experience is. If even the experience 
of low-level properties is enabled by top-down influences, where do you draw the line? 
One might say that you draw the line at that which remains the same when the sensory 
inputs are kept the same. But arguably, even at the very front line of sensation, top-down 
effects have influence (see e.g. Lee 2002 for vision, Davis and Johnsrude 2007 for 
8 When you hear the Kinks song, Lola, you don’t literally attribute different mental states to Ray 
Davies depending on how you disambiguate “I’m glad I’m a man and so is Lola”. But you do 
experience it differently depending on how you disambiguate it, and this comes down to 















audition). And if top-down influences enable us to hear sounds a certain way, why not 
allow that top-down influences enable us to experience meanings? Granted, such a 
response on the part of the liberal raises problems about sensory modality. If the speaker 
meaning (the mental state, real or hypothetical) behind an utterance is represented in 
perceptual experience, then surely it must be represented in a sensory modality, namely, 
audition? But isn’t it implausible to say that mental states are auditorily represented? I 
surely cannot literally hear your beliefs.
It doesn’t matter for our purposes whether the phenomenological changes in the 
experience are down to properly “perceptual” features of the experience, or to some kind 
of non-perceptual experiential accompaniment (e.g., some kind of stimulus-bound 
cognitive or affective phenomenology). What matters to us here is that the overall 
experience of speech is extremely representationally rich, regardless of whether all of the 
features can be thought of as perceptual or non-perceptual. In particular, we think that, as 
well as the low-level features of loudness, pitch, and timbre, the states of mind underlying 
utterances can at times also be part of what is represented in the experience of those 
utterances.
9.5. The Experiential Content of Inner Speech
Although we think that the lessons are transferrable, we cannot assume that the content of 
your experience of someone else’s outer speech is similar to the content of your own inner 
speech. To argue for this step by step, it is helpful to move from experience of someone 
else’s speech to a qualitatively intermediate stage on the way to inner speech: the 
experience of your own speech spoken out loud.
So, what is the difference between hearing someone else’s speech and experiencing your 
own speech? First of all, you don’t only experience your own speech by hearing it. You are 
proprioceptively and sensorially aware of your speech production apparatus. But that’s not 
the only thing: you have a sense of agency, in both the sense that you tend to be aware that 
it is you who is speaking, and also in the more specific sense that what you say tends not 
to come as a surprise. In spite of this difference, you also tend to know who is speaking 
when you hear others speak, and what comes out of the mouths of people you know really 
well tends not to come as a surprise either (and conversely you can sometimes surprise 
yourself). Another difference between your speech (and your action generally) and the 
speech of others, is that it is embedded in a rich and pervasive context that you (normally) 
have unparalleled access to (not least because you are always with yourself). You tend to 
speak as part of an overall complex serial process (namely, your life) in the service of you 
plans, goals, habits, machinations. And you are there to witness it all, effortlessly taking in 
the past and projecting into the future.
We agree that there are major asymmetries between the epistemology of your own speech 
and the speech of others. These are asymmetries that parallel the difference between 
experiencing yourself act, and perceiving others act. That said, these are epistemological 
differences, rather than differences in experiential content. Your access to the experiential 













content of your own speech may be more direct, more secure, and aided by a pervasive 
context, but that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t have a similar kind of content to that of 
someone else’s speech. Thus, we suggest, the experience of your own outer speech, like the 
experience of someone else’s speech, doesn’t only represent the low-level acoustic 
properties of your speech (as well as low-level features that are lacking in the experience 
of someone else speaking, such as tactile and proprioceptive information about your 
speech production) but also mental state information.
It is a small step from the experience of our own outer speech to the experience of our 
inner speech. Of course, the experiences are qualitatively rather different, but they 
achieve, or at least can achieve, the same thing. For example, you can (in situations when 
you are alone, or social norms allow it), replace your inner speech with outer speech with 
very much the same effect. Encouraging yourself with “Come on!” during a game of 
tennis, or asking yourself “What did I come upstairs for?” can be done in either inner or 
outer speech with similar effect (although there may be an added motivational effect to 
saying the former out loud).
In outer speech, there is lots of fine-grained auditory information in the content of the 
experience. If you were to mishear the pitch at which you were speaking, that would be 
relatively unimportant in most cases, but it would still be an inaccurate experience. You 
can imagine someone who hears pitch distortions, but still manages to pick up on the 
content and nuances of utterances. Another interesting case to reflect on in this instance is 
when congenitally deaf people learn to speak. In these cases they are producing speech 
sounds that they themselves cannot hear, for the benefit of a hearing interlocutor. But in 
what sense is their own experience, with its proprioceptive and tactile feedback elements, 
failing to adequately represent their speech? Sure, it is not representing the sounds they 
are producing, but does that mean that it is not still representing what is by far the most 
valuable aspect of the speech, namely, what is being conveyed? Clearly the deaf speaker 
has an experiential appreciation of what they are saying in the absence of hearing what 
they are saying. In short, even in cases where sounds are being produced, what is more 
significant are the mental states—the speaker meanings—expressed in speech.
How does all of this apply to inner speech? Given that, in inner speech, there is no real-
world auditory information to accurately represent, the information about mental states 
seems to be even more at the heart of what is carried by the vehicle of inner speech. An 
experience of inner speech, insofar as it is of an inner speech act, typically represents the 
state of mind expressed by that speech act, and, however minimally, the individual whose 
state of mind it is, namely, you. Thus when you assert something in inner speech, the 
conscious experience of that represents your belief in that which you have asserted, and, 
somewhat trivially, represents it as belonging to you. This much can also be said about 
hearing someone (yourself or someone else) sincerely assert something in outer speech. 
However, in contrast to this, it is hard to see how things like loudness, pitch, and timbre 
(or even phonology) can be represented in a relevantly committal way in inner speech. 
They may be (and often probably are) represented insofar as they contribute to the 














pink unicorn in a way that is reflected in the episode’s phenomenology), but it seems that 
there is no feature of the world that would make that aspect of the experience accurate or 
not.9 To make matters clearer, consider the fact that in hearing your own outer speech, 
you might mishear, e.g., the pitch at which you spoke, and this is determined by an 
objective feature of the world (namely, the actual pitch of the sounds you produced). It is 
not clear how something like this would work for inner speech. Although you could 
imagine someone complaining to a doctor and saying “I’m hearing my own voice 2 tones 
lower than it actually is”, such a complaint would make no sense in inner speech. There is 
no epistemic distance between how inner speech really is in terms of pitch and how it is 
experienced as being (just like there is no epistemic distance between my imagining of a 
pink unicorn and how it is experienced as being: how it is experienced as being 
constitutes the imaginative episode). However, in contrast, the mental and agentive 
aspects are the same in both inner and outer speech. And whether your experience of 
those aspects is accurate is determined by objective features of the world, namely, your 
actual state of mind. Such objective features are precisely what enables us to draw the 
boundary between sincerity and insincerity. “Great drawing!” you might say, in response 
to your friend’s woeful attempt at a sketch, with a feigned air of sincerity in your voice so 
as not to offend them. The actual insincerity of that speech act is an objective fact about 
the world, largely determined by the fact that you don’t really positively evaluate their 
drawing. Similarly, saying, “I’m such an idiot!” in inner speech is accurate to the extent 
that you are genuinely reprimanding yourself, which, like any speech act, requires you to 
be in a very particular mental state.
9.6. The Ways in Which Inner Speech Can (and Can’t) Mislead
As we’ve already mentioned, it is not clear that auditory or even phonological properties 
which may well be represented in inner speech (as reflected in the phenomenology of 
some inner speech) are subject to inaccuracy. They are cases of “content without 
commitment”, since it really isn’t clear what objective feature of the world, over and above 
the experience of those auditory or phonological properties themselves, might act as a 
benchmark against which they could fall short. In contrast, the agent and their mental 
state is precisely such an objective part of the world, and is one that, crucially, an inner 
speech act may well, in principle, misrepresent. Now let’s examine ways in which this can 
be misrepresented.
In producing an inner speech act and becoming aware of it, you become aware, in the 
good case, that (i) the mental state expressed is such and such (i.e., the speech act has a 
certain meaning), and (ii) you are the agent of the speech act (i.e., it is you, and not 
someone else, who has the mental state the speech act expresses). As a result, it seems to 
us that you can in principle have two errors, which might sometimes occur together.
9 Note that this will apply even in the case of having a dialogue with another person in inner 
speech. You might be talking to your mother in your head, for example, and be getting her voice 
all wrong, but you would still be talking to your mother.













A. Misrepresenting the state of mind you actually have.
B. Misrepresenting the agent of the speech act (namely, whose speech act it is).
We take it that, on reflection, A is relatively common. Both culpable insincerities and 
innocent inaccuracies regularly creep into our inner speech, and do so with negative 
impact upon our self-knowledge (although they may have positive impact in non-
epistemic ways, e.g., on psychological comfort or well-being).
B, on the other hand, seems much less common. However, if the model according to 
which (at least some) auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are misattributed episodes of 
inner speech is correct, then it might be something that one sees in those instances. And if 
that is the case, one interesting question, which to our knowledge has never been 
addressed in this way, is whether in these cases you get misrepresentations of just B, or of 
both A and B? In other words, does the speech act the voice-hearer experiences in some 
cases express a mental state that she herself “really has deep down”? In which case, is it 
something that is protectively disowned in a failure to recognize it as her own mental 
state? Some cases of AVH in the context of very strong feelings of shame and self-loathing 
may be like this.10 Or is it that the voice-hearer has produced an episode of inner speech 
that is somehow expressively inaccurate, namely, doesn’t express a mental state that the 
voice-hearer actually has, and so is attributed to another agent (as in, for example, 
Stephens and Graham’s (2000) model of ego-dystonic thoughts being misattributed as 
alien “voices”). This latter option in a sense does not involve the same degree of lack of 
self-knowledge. Although there is failure to detect self-production, the voice-hearer has in 
fact accurately detected that she doesn’t have the relevant mental state. This then raises a 
number of interesting further questions. For example, if the episode of inner speech (the 
inner speech act) that constitutes the AVH is not an expression of the voice-hearer’s own 
mental state, then whose mental state is it? Where does the voice (in the sense of the agent 
producing the speech act) come from? This may then lead us to hypothesize that voice 
hearers countenance rich and relatively autonomous representations of communicative 
agents (see Deamer & Wilkinson 2015, Wilkinson & Bell 2016). Then, of course, the 
question arises as to where this agent representation comes from. Why is it voice-hearers 
who have a propensity to represent agents in this way? Perhaps at this point it makes sense 
to suggest that it isn’t only voice-hearers who have this propensity. Indeed it can be argued 
(see McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough 2011) that normal inner speech can be dialogic and is 
shot through with representations of agents other than ourselves making speech acts. For 
example, reasonably large proportions of respondents endorse statements about hearing 
the voices of other people in inner speech (McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough 2011, 
Alderson-Day et al. 2014). Hence our inner speech sometimes expresses mental states that 
we don’t in fact have but that we hypothesize someone else might have. This would clearly 
10 See Woods et al. (2015) for a recent phenomenological survey exploring, among other 
things, the varied emotional states that surround the experience of hearing voices (depression is 














be helpful, and may play a crucial role in underpinning social, and perhaps even 
normative, reasoning.
If the inner speech model of AVHs is accurate, these reflections on inner speech acts add a 
dimension of complexity to the phenomenon in question. These experiences are not just 
straightforward hallucinations of sounds that aren’t there (although in many cases they 
are partly this). They are experiences of mental states, had by people with mental states, 
and so admit of the different dimensions of inaccuracy explained above.
9.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have combined a particular view about the nature of inner speech with 
a liberal view about the representational content of speech experience. Our view of inner 
speech thinks of inner speech as speech in a number of important ways. It is a productive 
rather than re-creative phenomenon, and, as with speech, its normal ecological use is in 
the performing of speech acts. Our liberal view about the content of speech experience 
allows that, in addition to the speech sounds that you hear when someone speaks to you, 
what their speech means, where this is seen as speaker meaning (e.g. their communicative 
intentions), also enters into the content of the experience. Applying this to inner speech, 
although there appears to be no constraint of accuracy on the experience of speech 
sounds (since there are no objective speech sounds produced that could be accurately or 
inaccurately represented), there is a constraint for the agentive elements of the experience. 
The mental state that you happen to be in when you engage in inner speech is an objective 
fact, and your episode of inner speech could mislead you about it. Within this framework 
there is a great deal of work that could be done in ascertaining when and how people 
mislead themselves in inner speech, and as a result develop flaws in their self-knowledge. 
In more extreme cases, this approach could be used to explore cases of AVH.
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